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recognition of a disputable claim and humanitarian or charitable
gestures do not constitute acknowledgments, halting the progress of
prescription.
Crump alternatively argued that her inaction was
justified because the employees of the Authority assured her they were
going to fix the problem, ultimately lulling her into a course of
inaction. The supreme court determined that Crump's allegations did
not prevent the running of prescription. Therefore, because Crump's
negligence action had prescribed, the supreme court dismissed her
suit.
Vanessa L. Condra

MAINE
Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999) (holding that Maine
continues to follow the absolute dominion rule).
Giles owned and operated a gravel pit adjacent to the Maddockses'
property.
Although the Maddockses' did not live there, an
underground spring historically produced large quantities of water
beneath this property. The Maddockses filed a complaint in 1994
alleging that Giles' gravel excavation depleted the spring's water.
Prior to trial, the court recognized the general rule that although a
landowner had the right to use his land for lawful purposes, he may
not disrupt a watercourse causing injury to neighboring landowners.
At trial, the jury preliminarily determined whether the spring
constituted a watercourse. A watercourse must have a substantial and
well defined existence. Water in a watercourse must flow in a specific
direction in a regular channel, with a bed and banks and sides. Also, it
generally flows into another body of water. The jury found that the
spring under the Maddockses property was not a watercourse and the
court granted judgment to Giles.
On appeal, the Maddockses asked the court to abandon the
dominion rule in favor of groundwater rules set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The dominion rule held that the
landowner had absolute ownership of the groundwater beneath his
land, similar to the soils and rocks surrounding it. Under this rule, a
landowner has no liability for digging a well on his property while
causing percolating water of his neighbor's property to dry up. The
Maddockses argued that the dominion rule was based on faulty
science, other jurisdictions have used modern science as the basis for
abandoning this rule, and only a few jurisdictions continue to follow it.
This court declined to reject the dominion rule. First, they found
the rule still suitable for use in Maine; even if modern science changed
views on groundwater, the rule could still operate adequately in Maine.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that landowners have relied on
this rule for over a century. Absent proof of its counterproductivity,
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the court will not change it.
Second, the court felt that the legislature should make the decision
whether to abandon the old dominion rule. The legislature had
created a board to study Maine water law. In 1991, this board
suggested that Maine adopt reasonable use principles. The legislature
declined to adopt those reasonable use principles and left the
common law as it currently stands.
The court also noted that the legislature previously created an
exception to the old dominion rule. This exception created liability
where a landowner withdraws groundwater in excess of single-family
household purposes interfering with his neighbor's preexisting
household groundwater use. However, this exception did not apply
here since the Maddockses have no preexisting household
groundwater use.
Since the court declined to abandon the old dominion rule, they
found the trial court had correctly applied Maine law.
Shana Smilovits

Trask v. Public Util. Conm'n, 731 A.2d 430 (Me. 1999) (holding that
several cities located near a water utility's dam had right of first refusal
to purchase the dam).
In 1982, the Gardiner Water District ("District") constructed a
hydroelectric facility at the New Mills Dam ("Dam") site to generate
power. The Dam operated under a power purchase contract with the
Central Maine Power Company ("CMPC"), until the CMPC bought out
the contract. Subsequently, the District surrendered the Dam's
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license, and the District no
longer utilized the Dam. By September 1997, the District began steps
to abandon the Dam pursuant to the Maine Dam Abandonment Act.
The statute required the District to consult with municipalities, local
landowners and state agencies to discover whether any of them desired
to purchase the dam. The District did not locate a buyer until George
Trask offered to purchase the Dam in March 1998. Several concerned
citizens filed objections with the Public Utilities Commission
("Commission") subsequent to this offer. The Commission decided
that, pursuant to its own rules and a separate state statute ("section
6109") governing sales of water utility property, the District's
acceptance of Trask's offer was subject to a right of first refusal held by
the City of Gardiner and several local towns. The Commission decided
that the municipalities had this right since the property for sale was
greater than five acres, as required by section 6109. The Commission
included the Dam, the land on which it sits, and the water rights in
terms of flowage in order to find the total acreage of the property.
The Commission included flowage, since it determined that the
District proposed to transfer not only the Dam, but any water rights it
possessed.

